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STUDENT COMMENTS
SINGLE SUBJECT RESTRICTIONS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE LINE-ITEM VETO
NANCY J. TOWNSEND*
INTRODUCTION
The astronomical growth of the federal deficit1 has gen-
erated a public demand for greater control over government
spending.2 Spending control may be achieved in one of two
general ways: (1) limiting Congress itself; or (2) enhancing
the President's veto power. Although ostensibly the Constitu-
tion gives the President the power to veto legislation,- the
practice of logrolling4 appropriation bills5 weakens the execu-
* B.A., 1982, Marian College Indianapolis; J.D. 1985, University of
Notre Dame; Thos. J. White Scholar, 1984-85.
1. Federal government spending increased by 345 percent between
1974 and 1983. 130 CONG. REc. S5301 (daily ed. May 3, 1984) (material
inserted by Sen. Mattingly). In 1974, the Federal government was spending
18.5 percent of the Gross National Product and now spends nearly 25 per-
cent of the GNP. 129 CONG. REC. S13591 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1983) (remarks
by Sen. Mattingly).
2. In a public opinion poll of 1,267 adults, seventy-one percent con-
sidered a $200 billion dollar deficit to be "very serious," eighteen percent
considered it "somewhat serious," and only five percent considered it "not
very serious." (Poll conducted for Business Week in December of 1983 by
Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., reported in Cutting the Deficit: Hard
Choices, 16 NAT'L J. 1495 (1984).
For an analysis of the economic effects of the deficit, see Woodward, CRS
Discusses Effect of Deficits on the Economy, 20 TAX NOTES 825 (September 5,
1983). Aside from any as to the economic impact of deficits in the credit
market, interests costs of the federal deficit consume government dollars
which could otherwise be used for valuable public services. See Manvel,
Another 'Squeeze' From Huge Federal Deficits, 21 TAx NOTE 512 (Nov. 7,
1983).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2.
4. As used here, logrolling includes other legislative practices such
as attaching riders of new and unrelated enactments as amendments to
bills; the addition of funding for projects which are local in nature, often
referred to as legislative "pork-barreling"; and so-called "Christmas trees,"
which are legislative bills adorned with other, usually unrelated, bills at the
end of a Congressional session. See Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294
Md. 285, 449 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1982); Wass v. Anderson, 312 Minn. 395,
398-399, 252 N.W.2d 131, 135 (1977); Gellert v. Alaska, 522 P.2d 1120
(1974).
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tive's ability to act as an external check on Congressional
spending.'
"Logrolling" refers to the practice of combining several
different subjects of legislation, any of which might not pass
on its own merits, into a single bill in order to achieve major-
ity support for the combination.' This combining of unre-
5. The legislative process is customarily described as a two-step pro-
cedure: authorization of programs as recommended by substantive legisla-
tive committees, followed by the financing of those programs by appropria-
tions committees. Appropriation bills are bills which direct the executive to
cause money to be drawn from the treasury in specified amounts. For a
thorough discussion of the process, see Fisher, Authorization-Appropriation
Process in Congress, 29 CATH.U.L.REv. 51 (1979); See also Andrus v. Sierra
Club, 442 U.S. 347, 356-364 (1979) (the Supreme Court endorses the dis-
tinctions between the appropriation and authorization stages).
6. See remarks of Senators Alan Dixon and Mack Mattingly on the
floor of the Senate. 130 CONG. REc. S5297-S5321 (daily ed. May 3, 1984)
and 130 CONG. REC. S836-838 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983). Former U.S. Attor-
ney General, Griffin Bell, has written that a basic cause of the Federal gov-
ernment's inability to control budget deficits is that "no counterforce exists
against the special-interest groups that are the driving force behind exces-
sive government spending." Exhibit 1 in 130 CONG. REC. S5303 (daily ed.
May 3, 1984).
7. Two theorists of the decision-making process, James Buchanan
and Gordon Tullock, define logrolling to refer broadly to legislative vote-
trading. Their definition includes two distinct types of conduct. The first
involves a relatively small group of individuals who openly vote for each
others' measures as they arise in a continuing sequence of measures. The
second type of conduct included in Buchanan and Tullock's definition of
logrolling is a stricter of logrolling. It is used throughout this discussion
and only includes the of different voting issues into a single piece of legisla-
tion allowing only a single yes or no vote. Buchanan and Tullock call this
conduct "implicit logrolling." It occurs where large bodies of voters are
called on to decide a number of complex issues but each voter gets only
one vote. The vote-seeker combines the mixture of policies which will at-
tract the greatest support and alienate the fewest voters. Distinct provisions
are actually tacked onto each other and "rolled" together. Buchanan and
Tullock suggest that this type of logrolling is characteristic of modern
democratic institutions. BUCHANAN AND TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CON-
SENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
For variations of this definition which have been used by the federal judi-
ciary and that of various states, see Andrews v. Governor of Maryland, 294
Md. 285, 449 A.2d 1144, 1148 (1982) ("two or more propositions essen-
tially dissimilar in subject matter are submitted to electorate in one amend-
ment so that voter is bound, in order to secure enactment of provision
which he favors, to vote for others of which he may disapprove"; Bengzon
v. Secretary of Justice of the Philippine Islands, 299 U.S. 410, 415 (1937)
("in order to secure the requisite majority to carry necessary and proper
items of appropriation, unnecessary or even indefensible items are some-
times included"); Tolson v. Police Jury, 119 La. 215, 43 So. 1011 (1907);
("combining of several questions so that a voter cannot exercise his inde-
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lated subjects into a bill upon which the President has but a
single veto has weakened the power of the executive veto.
The President cannot make full use of his Constitutional veto
power over multisubject legislation because often a multisub-
ject bill contains some provisions the President approves and
some he disapproves. Logrolling occurs with both substantive
and appropriations legislation, which is legislation permitting
disbursements of federal monies. When faced with a mul-
tisubject spending bill containing some objectionable provi-
sions, the President must choose between signing the entire
bill, thus approving objectionable provisions, or vetoing the
entire bill, and thus delaying or blocking funding for essen-
tial government programs.
For example, knowing that the Reagan administration
strongly opposed a federal bill to fund two Boston highway
projects and dozens of other road-building proposals, House
Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. added an amendment which,
if enacted, would substantially reduce federal funding to
states which did not raise their legal drinking age to twenty-
one.' O'Neill knew that the President strongly favored the
twenty-one year old minimum drinking age and believed that
Reagan would not veto a bill containing such a provision.
O'Neill's strategy worked and Boston got its highway
projects. By logrolling, O'Neill forced Reagan to approve of
the road-building projects, which he considered unwise fed-
eral spending, in order to enact the wholly unrelated drink-
ing age portion of the bill.
The item veto has been proposed as one way to reverse
the effects of logrolling on the executive veto." An item veto
power would allow the President to veto individual items of a
spending bill while still enacting the remainder of the legisla-
tion. Such a veto would purportedly alleviate the effects of
logrolling by allowing the President to dismantle multisubject
pendent judgment as to one or more of the several propositions but must
either adopt or reject them as a whole"); Comonwealth v. Barnett, 199 Pa.
161, 48 A. 976, 977 (1901) ("corrupt combinations of minorities with dif-
ferent interests to force passage of bills with provisions which could never
succeed if they stood on their separate merits."); Attorney General v.
Amos, 60 Mich. 372, 27 N.W. 571, 572 (1886) ("secure . . . passage by a
union of interests") (quoting People v. Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553 (1872).
8. 16 NAT'L J. 1167 (June 16, 1984)
9. The major item veto proposals in Congress include H.R. 470
(Rep. W. R. Archer, R-TX); S.J. Res. 178, S. 1921 (Sen. Mack Mattingly,
R-GA); H.J. Res. 357 (Rep. Jack Kemp, R-NY); H.J. Res. 399 (Rep. George
Gekas, R-PA); H.J. Res. 436 (Rep. Bill Green, R-NY); and S.J. Res. 26
(Sen. Alan Dixon, D-IL).
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bills into their distinct spending items and then exercise his
veto power over those that are objectionable.
For example, in the Boston road-building example re-
ferred to above, 10 the item veto would have allowed the Pres-
ident to veto the highway projects, which he disapproved,
while still enacting the amendment that would cut funds to
states which refused to raise the legal drinking age to twenty-
one. O'Neill's road-building provisions, because they were a
separate line item, would have been subject to a veto without
interfering with Reagan's desire to enact the drinking age
amendment.
The item veto approach is essentially an effects-focused
solution to the problem of logrolling. That is, it does not con-
front the underlying causes of logrolling, but merely provides
an after-the-fact discretionary check.
Another type of approach to achieving spending control
is to place limits on Congress itself. This type of approach
seeks to impose external constraints whereas the item veto
imposes no control on the action of Congress but applies only
to the fruits of those actions. One such method of imposing
external constraints, which is not discussed here, is the widely
debated Balanced Budget Amendment.1 A second method,
is a Single Subject Amendment prohibiting bills from em-
bracing more than a single subject of legislation.
This article examines the Single Subject Amendment
proposal and concludes that the most effective and appropri-
ate means of eliminating the adverse effects of legislative log-
rolling is to eliminate the practice itself. Part I identifies and
describes the problem of legislative logrolling; Part II ex-
plores the item veto as a solution to the problem of legislative
logrolling; and Part III proposes a Constitutional amendment
to prohibit Congressional bills from encompassing more than
a single subject and explains how a Single Subject Amend-
10. See NAT'L J., supra note 8 and accompanying text.
11. One version of the so-called Balanced Budget Amendment, em-
bodied in Senate Joint Resolution 5 received President Reagan's endorse-
ment as a method of "making the government live within its means" and
the President suggested that "doing so will ultimately do more to bringing
down interest rates and put our unemployed back to work than anything
else we could do." 128 CONG. REc. S8555-8556 at S8556 (daily ed. July 19,
1982) (text of President Reagan's speech at the kick-off rally for the Bal-
anced Budget Amendment on the steps of the U.S. Capitol). For a discus-
sion of the superiority of the Balanced Budget Amendment over the Line
Item Veto as a solution to federal fiscal problems, see letter to the the edi-
tor by Lewis K. Uhler (President of the National Tax-Limitation Commit-
tee) Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1983, at 31, col. 1.
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ment would address the shortcomings of the line item veto.
I. LEGISLATIVE LOGROLLING
In addition to increasing federal spending, logrolling
makes legislators less accountable by giving them an excuse
for their votes in Congress that contribute to record-breaking
spending deficits. That is, a legislator may report to his con-
stituents that he felt obliged to vote for an excessive appro-
priations bill because it contained a spending program that
directly benefits his constituents. Thus, the legislator can
deny responsibility for aggregate spending levels even though
he might have voted in favor of each of the appropriations he
contends were unavoidable parts of the package. He can tell
his constituents that, notwithstanding the tax and deficit im-
plications of his voting, his vote was principled, responsible,
and necessary because it helped to acquire the federal spend-
ing programs beneficial to local interests.
A requirement that bills be separated into their distinct
logical units, would allow a legislator to vote against spending
measures that add costs to the federal spending program
without contributing sufficiently offsetting benefits. Legisla-
tors would still be free to bargain and trade votes on separate
bills and it is therefore quite possible that many of the local
spending programs could receive majority support when
presented individually. That is, requiring the separation of
logically distinct subjects of legislation would not necessarily
foreclose the enactment of federal spending for local inter-
ests. It would, however, block the enactment of such spend-
ing unless that project could, on its own merit or by actual
agreement, generate majority support.
At first glance, it may be difficult to imagine Congress
enacting a rule to place procedural limits on itself. However,
imposing limits on the practice of logrolling would, in some
important respects, increase the voting flexibility and power
of choice for individual members of Congress.
A. Logrolling and the Federal Budget Process
In order to understand this proposition, some discussion
of the federal budget process is necessary. The Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Act) cur-
rently governs the Congressional budgetary process.12 The
12. 2 U.S.C. §601 et. seq. The Act placed restrictions on presidential
impoundments of funds, provided for the formation of the Congressional
19851
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Act sets budgeting timetables for some of the standing com-
mittees including: authorizing committees, the Ways and
Means Committee (both an authorizing and revenue-raising
committee), and the Appropriations Committee. The Act re-
quires committees to submit a report to the Budget Commit-
tee of cost estimates for programs under their jurisdiction by
March 15 each year. The Joint Budget Committee then uses
those estimates to develop the first concurrent budget resolu-
tion. The Act requires the authorization committees to re-
port on any legislation providing new authorization by May
15 of the year prior to the fiscal year for which it would be-
come effective.
The Act also distinguishes between two sorts of legisla-
tion: budget authorization and appropriations."3 The Act
uses the term "budget authority" to refer to "authority pro-
vided by law to enter into obligations which will result in im-
mediate or future outlays involving Government funds" ex-
cluding authority to insure or guarantee the repayment of
indebtedness incurred by another person or government.14
This authorizing legislation, "enacted by the Congress to set
up or continue the operation of a federal program or
agency" is normally a prerequisite for subsequent appropria-
tions.1 5 In the authorization process, substantive legislative
committees set an expenditure ceiling for substantive govern-
mental programs.1 Appropriations committees then allocate
fixed dollar amounts to those programs previously authorized
by the substantive committees.1 7 Appropriations legislation
directly' grants federal agencies the authority to incur finan-
cial obligations and to make payments of federal monies.1 '
Budget Office, and altered the dates of the fiscal year among other effects.
13. 2 U.S.C. §622.
14. 2 U.S.C. §622(2).
15. EXEC. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, UNITED STATES BUDGET IN
BRIEF: FY1985 (1984).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, §9. For example the Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education and Related Agencies Appro-
priation Act of 1985 directly appropriated money in the Treasury to fund
those agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1985. The bill con-
tained appropriations for the administration of these agencies as well as for
substantive programs within their jurisdiction. One example of the latter
was funding the federal interest subsidies for medical facilities, of the De-
partment of Health and Human Services. The funding provided by this
appropriations legislation was previously authorized by the Public Health
Service Act.
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Logrolling occurs in the process of budget making deci-
sions, because a legislator with a passionate interest in a given
measure has an equal vote with a legislator who is only
slightly interested in that measure.' If all voting members
have identical intensities of preference across all issues, then
no vote trading is possible. If the individual voter feels as
strongly about one issue as any other, he will never rationally
agree to trade his vote for a reciprocal favor. The intense
supporter of a given measure will exchange his vote on other
issues about which he is relatively indifferent to elicit the sup-
port for his measure from others. These others are presuma-
bly indifferent on this issue, but intense on others."
This vote trading is facilitated by logrolling because
these deals can be worked out in the context of a single bill.
Appropriations bills tend to attract rather than alienate posi-
tive votes because acquiring appropriations beneficial to con-
stituents is closely related to reelection support. Thus, the
more appropriations subjects in a single bill, the greater
power that bill has to attract the votes it needs for passage.2
As more subjects are logrolled into a bill, representatives
pick up votes which they did not actually have to solicit. For
example, if a member of Congress wishes to enact a military
procurement project to be located in his home district, he
can attract more votes by attaching his proposal to any essen-
tial appropriations bill. By so doing, that member may gain
majority support without soliciting votes or making the politi-
cal trades which are presumably the foundation of a logrolled
bill.22
19. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 132.
20. Buchanan and Tullock suggest that "under the rules within
which . . . assemblies operate, exchanges of votes are easy to arrange and
to observe." Id. at 135.
21. "[A]s the citizens of one state find that money, to raise in which
they in common with the whole country are taxed, is to be expended for
local improvements in another state, they demand similar benefits for
themselves, and it is not unnatural that they should seek to indemnify
themselves for such use of public funds by securing appropriations for simi-
lar improvements in their own neighborhood. Thus, as the bill becomes
more objectionable, it secures more support." (speech of President Arthur,
1882). 7 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 121 (1898).
22. One commentator wrote of appropriation bills long ago that
"[slometimes indeed the advocates of good causes actively support the bad
ones, because they need the support of the grafters . . . [t]he whole thing
is a mixture of 'log-rolling' and 'blackmail'." Editorial -by George Harvey,
NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Aug. 1916 at 178-179.
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B. Logrolling and Legislative Politics
The government of ancient Rome may have been the
first to adopt and then restrict the practice of legislative log-
rolling. In 98 B.C., a rule was enacted forbidding the propo-
sal of laws containing unrelated provisions.2 3 Since then many
governments have recognized the impact of logrolling.2' As
early as 1852, Senators were tacking nongermane spending
provisions onto appropriation bills2 5 and one senator recog-
nized that this strategy provided a tool by which to carry
spending proposals through Congress that "had not merit
within themselves to be carried through by themselves." 21
American presidents have likewise recognized the effects
of Congress' system of logrolling appropriations legislation.
Nearly every president, since Grant, has requested an item
veto power to curtail the negative impact of legislative log-
rolling on the executive veto.27
The Presentment Clause2 8 requires bills that have passed
the House and the Senate to be presented to the President
for approval or veto. It was chiefly designed to thwart a legis-
lative attack on the constitutional powers of the executive
and to give the President the power to veto a legislative act
23. LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 545 (1922). This rule against log-
rolling blocked the enactment of an omnibus bill which might have pre-
vented the insurrection of the Italian allies who caused the great Roman
Civil Wars.
24. Id. at 549.
25. Civil and Diplomatic Appropriations Bill of 1852, Ch. 108, 10
Stat. 76 (1852).
26. CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 1287 (1852) (remarks of Sen.
Jesse David Bright (D-IN)). See also LUCE, supra, note 24, at 1286. This
argument parallels the argument in favor of the line item veto that the
current legislative system effectively forces the President to accept nonmer-
itorious spending proposals when they are ensconced in essential appropri-
ation bills.
27. In 1873, Grant recommended to Congress that it recommend an
amendment "to authorize the Executive to approve of so much of any mea-
sure passing the two Houses of Congress as his judgment may dictate with-
out approving the whole, the disapproved portions or portions to be sub-
ject to the same rules as now." 7 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 242 (1898). See also 9 CONG. REC. 117 (1879) (remarks of Rep.
Garfield) and 9 CONG. REC. 560 (1879) (remarks of Rep. Burrows). In 1883,
Woodrow Wilson noticed the "mutual understanding" among representa-
tives that each will vote in (Committee of The Whole) for the grant desired
by the others, in consideration of the promise that they will cry 'aye' when
his item comes on to be considered." W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERN-
MENT (1959) at 121 (written in 1883).
28. U.S. CONST. art I, §7, cl. 2.
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"in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacri-
ficed."'29 Thus, Hamilton wrote:
The primary inducement to conferring the power in
question upon the Executive is to enable him to defend
himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in
favor of the community against the passing of bad laws
through haste, inadvertance, or design."
The Supreme Court 1 and many commentators 2 inter-
pret such language as an expression that those who drafted
and ratified the Presentment Clause contemplated its use as a
means of blocking legislation contrary to the President's
policies.
The practice of logrolling erodes the executive veto
power and thereby inhibits his primary check against legisla-
tive encroachments and misjudgments. President Reagan per-
ceives logrolling as an intrusion on the veto power and has
advocated the enactment of an item veto power to authorize
the dissection of logrolled bills."3
Some writers speculate that President Reagan, and presi-
dents generally, do not actually want the item veto power.34
In some respects the President can capitalize on the restraints
which logrolling place on him by shifting the blame for high
spending to a logrolling Congress. Eliminating the impact of
logrolling would remove one excuse from a president's reper-
toire of reasons for being unable to control federal spending.
Thus, some limit on logrolling would increase the executive's
accountability for national spending levels.
In the same way that logrolling encroaches on the presi-
dent's exercise of veto discretion, it impairs the exercise of
29. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 73 at 445 (Hamilton) (C. Rossiter
ed.).
30. Id. at 443.
31. See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919 (1983); Youngstown Sheet Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587,
(1952); and The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679 (1929).
32. See e.g., A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
338-39 (4th ed. 1970); J. STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES §885-886 (5th ed. 1905); Clineburg, The Presidential
Veto Power, 18 S.C.L. REV. 732, 737 (1966); Federal Administrative Law Devel-
opments - 1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285, 290.
33. The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session
of Congress, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 87 (Jan 25, 1984).
34. See e.g. Reagan to Seek a Law Allowing Him to Veto Item in Money
Bill-Is His Aim to Reduce the Budget or Cut Embarassment?, Wall St. J. (Jan.
5, 1984).
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voting discretion by members of Congress. Logrolling en-
ables some members of Congress to secure federal money for
local projects without such projects undergoing scrutiny from
other members." Federal projects such as water projects or
military procurement projects greatly enhance the local econ-
omies where they are located.36 A member of Congress who
is able to secure such a project for his constituents thereby
acquires better chances of reelection.17 Thus, securing fed-
eral money for use within a representative's district becomes
a primary concern. A member commands the vote of other
members by tacking his proposals onto those of others. Since
all of these members then have a direct interest in securing
the passage of the entire logrolled bill, the bill gets their vote
without much scrutiny of the merits of the individual propos-
als. Indiscriminate and inefficient expansion of federal spend-
ing is thus facilitated by Congressional logrolling.
Federal spending projects are highly attractive to constit-
uents in local districts in which they are located. Conse-
quently, these constituents might be tempted to accept the
indiscriminate spending which results from logrolling because
they think it a lesser evil than losing federal funds for local
projects. Under closer scrutiny, however, individual constitu-
ents should recognize that they have an interest in eliminating
the practice of logrolling. A member of Congress may believe
he is doing a constituent service by gaining popularity
through his unconditional votes in favor of other members'
local spending projects. Perhaps he believes that he is benefit-
ting his constituents by making friends in the legislature by
voting for their proposals without questioning the content
and purpose of the proposals. Constituents, however, as fed-
eral taxpayers have an interest in demanding that their repre-
sentatives vote against federal spending which imposes costs
on them but does not confer corresponding benefits on them.
If certain spending proposals do not benefit a representative's
35. Congress often must pass special interest and nongermane "rid-
ers" incorporated into last minute funding bills and resolutions that con-
tain essential appropriations. Pallfy, Line-Item Veto: Trimming the Pork, re-
printed in 130 CONG. REC. S5300 (daily ed. May 3, 1984).
36. See In Highway Bill Lobbying, the Touch is Local, 42 CONG. Q. 2194
(Sept. 8, 1984); BERMAN, IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED 324 (1964); ROBERT WAL-
LACE, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF FEDERAL SPENDING 32-33 (1960).
37. MAYHEW, THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
38. See Hill Politics Delay Repair of 'America' in Ruins, 42 CONG. Q.
2193 (Sept. 8, 1984). See also, 1984 Races Become Battlefield for Competing
Interest Groups, 42 CONG. Q. 2147 (Sept. 1, 1984).
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constituents, either as citizens of the local district or as citi-
zens of the nation as a whole, then those citizens should de-
mand a justification from a representative who votes for such
proposals. Logrolling precludes a member of Congress from
casting a vote against many spending subjects that he consid-
ers unwise because it prevents a member from simultaneously
opposing others' proposals that he believes to be profligate
and supporting his own or others' spending measures that he
believes to be wise and expedient federal spending.
Representative government, by its nature, demands that
its legislators harbor a plurality of loyalties. Representatives
enter office after having made promises and incurred obliga-
tions to a number of interests including a political party,
friends, lobbyists, and perhaps religious and civic organiza-
tions. Conflicts arise when national interests require a gov-
ernmental decision that is inconsistent with a previous prom-
ise or a present request that the representative has obligated
himself to satisfy. Federal spending decisions present one
such case.
Because securing federal funding to benefit constituents
is a more visible good than is blocking unwise federal fund-
ing, and because representatives find it politically advanta-
geous to engage in visibly good deeds, securing federal funds
takes a higher priority than blocking irresponsible spending.
When legislators allow a procedure such as logrolling to per-
sist, and ignore the fiscal consequences to the nation as a
whole, they fail in their obligation both to their constituents
and to the country. By focusing exclusively on the short-term
benefits to constituents, legislators ignore their obligation to
use' their judgment and political expertise to make decisions
that inure to the good of the nation as well as to the good of
their constituents.
In 1744, Edmund Burke wrestled with this conflict be-
tween short-term local interests and longer-term national
concerns. In his address to the Electors of Bristol,3 9 as a can-
didate to represent the city of Bristol in Parliament, he ex-
pounded the desirability of a representative's maintaining
close communication with his constituents. While constitu-
ents' wishes deserve great attention, and a representative has
a duty "above all, ever, and in all cases" to prefer the interest
of the constituents to his own,40 the representative has an ob-
ligation to his own conscience which is superior to his obliga-
39. BURKE, SPEECHES AND LETTERS ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS (1908).
40. Id.
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tion to be responsive to his constituents:
[A representative's] unbiassed opinion, his mature judg-
ment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to sacrifice
. . . to any man, or to any set of men living . . . [a repre-
sentative] owes . . . not his industry only, but his judgment;
and he betrays, instead of serving [his constituents] if he
sacrifices it to [their] opinion.4'
Nowhere is this obligation to exercise considered judg-
ment more important than in the area of appropriations and
government spending which so significantly affects the over
all economy. Because a representative sits to make laws for
the good of the republic, the interests of the nation as a
whole must take precedence over the narrow interests of his
constituents when these interests conflict. The legislator must
listen to the expressed opinion of his constituents as to spe-
cific matters, their use his judgment and experience to dis-
cern what these constituents would want if they had heard
the debates and had the political experience and judgment
for which they chose him. His judgment and knowledge must
substitute for deficiencies in judgment and knowledge among
his constituents.
C. Congressional Rules Restricting Content of Legislation
Since 1789, the House of Representatives has had a rule
requiring amendments to be germane to the subject of the
bill under consideration.' The rule has been interpreted to
allow a committee to report a bill embracing different sub-
jects and merely makes it out of order during consideration
on the floor in the House to introduce a new subject by way
of amendment. 43 The rule applies only to amendments and,
therefore, the House does not sustain an objection on
grounds that an appropriation which is reported by the com-
mittee within a general appropriation bill is not germane to
the rest of the bill.44
41. Id.
42. House Rule XVI, provides that" . . . no motion or proposition
on a subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted
under color of amendment." JEFFERSON'S MANUAL & RULES OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, 95th Cong. (1977).
43. 5 HINDS' PRECEDENTS, §5826 (1907-08).
44. Thus, when a representative raised a point of order that an ap-
propriation to increase certain fringe benefits to governmental officers was
not germane to a foreign aid spending bill, the point of order was over-
ruled. Because the committee reported on the fringe benefit provision with
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The Senate has a rule prohibiting amendments to a gen-
eral appropriation bill which are not germane or relevant to
the subject matter of the general appropriation bill.45 The
rule is very narrow in that it applies only to amendments to
the general appropriations bill and not to all bills which are
considered in the Senate. However, it does permit nonger-
mane amendments under specified conditions.46
Because of this narrow application of the rules on ger-
maneness, appropriation bills which contain diverse and dis-
tinct subjects of appropriation frequently pass in both the
House of Representatives and the Senate. Appropriation bills
with distinct subjects that are reported out of committee are
not subject to a point of order in either House under these
rules. This is one way by which multiple subjects become in-
cluded in an appropriation bill. Additionally, as indicated
above, rules against adding non-germane amendments are
not enforced in either House unless a member of Congress
raises a point of order to bar consideration of the nonger-
mane amendment. They are not inherently invalid.
D. Logrolling and Special Interests
Even though logrolling precludes the President and Con-
gress from considering logically disconnected spending mea-
sures on their individual merit, some scholars and commenta-
tors argue that logrolling is a legitimate legislative practice.4
the full bill to the House, the firnge benefit provision was not an amend-
ment and thus not subject to the rule that amendments must be germane
to the subject of the bill being reported. CONG. REC. (daily ed. Dec. 16,
1963) p. 24753.
45. Senate Rule XVI provides:
On a point of order made by any Senator, no amendments shall
be received to any general appropriation bill the effect of which
will be to increase an appropriation already contained in the bill,
or to add a new item of appropriation, unless it be made to carry
out the provisions of some existing law, or treaty stipulation, or
act or resolution previously passed by the Senate during that ses-
sion; or unless the same be moved by direction of the Committee
on Appropriations or of a committee of the Senate having legisla-
tive jurisdiction of the subject matter, or proposed in pursuance of
an estimate submitted in accordance with law.
SENATE MANUAL
46. Id.
47. Some view logrolling as the only power, apart from impeach-
ment, that Congress has against the oppressive use of the veto power by
the President and that depriving Congress of that power would destroy the
constitutional balance of powers and make the will of the legislature sub-
ject to the will of the Executive. See generally, Wilkenson, Observations on
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Logrolling has been praised as "the most characteristic legis-
lative process" because it embodies the give and take between
competing interests which lies at the heart of the American
democratic process.4 8 One theory is that logrolling permits a
system of practical compromises and trading by legislators. 49
This analysis fails to recognize, however, that legislators are
not pressured to arrive at "give and take" compromises in
formulating appropriations legislation. 50 With no effective
ceiling on federal spending, each legislator continues to
"take" limited only by the force of other members' desires to
"take" as well-.51
In some cases a logrolled bill may represent legitimate
vote-solicitation by legislators. Conduct by which one mem-
ber of Congress explicitly agrees to exchange one vote for
another permits minority interests to band together to ac-
quire each of their desires. When measures come up for vote
in a continuing sequence and legislators have agreed openly
to vote for each others' measures as they arise, individual
members can vote on distinct issues or separate appropria-
tions as they choose. Their own appropriations proposals are
not directly jeopardized if they are independently worthy of
passage. The only direct restraint on any member's vote is
any previous commitment he may have made to vote for a
particular measure. As Madison noted in The Federalist, this
accommodation of a rich variety of interests affords protec-
tion against any one party being able to outnumber and op-
press the rest.52
If, however, legislators combine a multiplicity of minor-
ity interests into a single bill or tack minority proposals onto
an unrelated proposal with majority support Madison's ac-
commodation of a rich variety of interests may become an
accommodation of every interest. Many complex issues enter
into each appropriations bill and each member must weigh all
of these issues and cast a single vote for or against the mul-
tisubject appropriations bill. Logrolling enables a member of
the Item Veto, 25 GEO. L.J. 106 (1936).
48. ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1967).
49. Id.
50. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN COMMITTEES (1973), at 58 suggests that
House Committees attempt "to process and pass all requests and. . . do so
in such a way as to maximize the chances of passage .... "
51. For a detailed explication of this argument, see Wildavsky, Item
Veto Without a Global Spending Limit: Locking the Treasury after the Dollars
Have Fled, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 165 (1984).
52. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 10 (J. Madison)
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Congress to garner the votes of others by simply adding his
own proposal to those of another member without necessarily
striking an agreement to do so."' Members of Congress feel
obliged to vote for a grant of funds to benefit their constitu-
ents and some of them may do so regardless of the bill to
which such a spending grant is attached. Further, they may
do so without having engaged in the give and take which the-
oretically characterizes legislative democracy.
For example, if an appropriations bill contains a suffi-
cient collection of local spending projects to directly benefit
the constituents of 218 members of the House it stands a
good chance of passage in the House. Even though none of
these individual proposals can fairly be deemed to have inde-
pendent majority support, each nonetheless passes by a ma-
jority. Although a vote in favor of an omnibus bill implies
assent to all the provisions therein, such a vote is more sym-
bolic of the strength of the support of each in favor of his"
own proposal. 4 Because an omnibus bill may contain a provi-
sion a member of Congress feels obliged to support, his sup-
port for that provision and obligation to oppose is unavoid-
ably translates into support for other unwise provisions.
Thus, the effect of logrolling on the judgment of each Con-
gressman is often similar to its effect on the executive's exer-
cise of judgment.
Because logrolling facilitates and encourages pork-barrel
spending, it drives up the cost of government. Because it
camoflages such spending in necessary legislation, it reduces
legislative accountability. Finally, because it enables weak
proposals to bypass legislative scrutiny, it violates principles
of legislative advocacy and support solicitation. It concomi-
tantly robs the executive and the legislator of the effective
exercise of that judgment for which each was elected. In
short, it can be seen as a decidedly undemocratic practice in a
democratic process.
The following sections will examine two possible solu-
53. Although Congressmembers superficially approve of logrolling
by their affirmative vote on a logrolled bill, that affirmative vote no more
represents an approval of logrolling than the President's affirmative vote
on a piece of logrolled legislation. Presidential approval of such a bill is an
indication that he views a particular spending provision as absolutely essen-
tial, notwithstanding the repugnant provisions to which it is attached. A
Congressmembers approval of such a bill makes the same statement
athough often he considers it essential because his Congressional career is
riding on it because of constituent pressures.
54. BERMAN, IN CONGRESS ASSEMBLED (1964)
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tions to the problem of logrolling. The first is the line-item
veto. The line item veto is essentially a symptom-focused so-
lution, permitting logrolling where the President does not
object to its results. The second solution, a proposed Single
Subject Admendment, not only alleviates the symptoms, but
focuses on eliminating logrolling altogether.
II. ITEM VETO AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
A. Description and Purpose of Line Item Veto
The line item veto 55 has been heralded as a means of re-
storing executive control over unwise federal spending that
the current executive veto cannot control because of legisla-
tive logrolling. 56 Proponents argue that legislative logrolling
has weakened the executive veto as a check on Congressional
appropriations and has thereby upset the constitutional bal-
ance of powers57
Several bills have been proposed in Congress to grant
the President the power to veto individual items of appropri-
ations. Senate Joint Resolution 128, the leading item veto
proposal in Congress, proposes a constitutional amendment
allowing the President to veto any item of appropriation, ex-
cept appropriations for the legislative or the judicial branches
of government. 58 Items not vetoed would become law and
55. Unless otherwise specified, this discussion of the item veto refers
to the power of the Chief Executive to veto items from appropriations bills
as that power is proposed in S.J. Res. 128, 129 CONG. REc. S13591 (daily
ed. Oct. 5, 1983) by Sen. Mack Mattingly.
56. See remarks of Senators Alan Dixon and Mack Mattingly on the
Senate floor. 130 CONG. REC. S5297-S5321 (daily ed. May 3, 1984) and 130
CONG. REC. S837 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983).
57. Id.
58. Proposed amendment S.J.Res. 128 provides:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of
each House concurring therein), That the following article is pro-
posed as an amendment to the Constitution, which shall be valid
to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when rati-
fied by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within
seven years after the date of its submission to the States for
ratification:
"Article-
The President may disapprove any item of appropriation in any
Act or joint resolution, except any item of appropriation for the
legislative branch or the judicial branch of the Government. If an
Act or joint resolution is approved by the President, any item of
appropriation contained therein which is not disapproved shall be-
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items vetoed may be enacted over the president's veto in the
same manner prescribed by article I, section 7 of the
Constitution.
59
Other variations of the line item veto proposal have been
introduced in Congress as well. e0 One such variation is Senate
Joint Resolution 26 which proposes a constitutional amend-
ment to allow the President to disapprove or reduce distinct
items or amounts of an appropriations bill, if doing so would
not affect the other purposes and provisions of the bill."x
Under this proposal, Congress could override the veto of any
appropriations item by a simple majority of each house,
rather than a two-thirds majority.
The line item veto would purportedly reduce excessive
federal spending resulting from legislative logrolling 2 by al-
lowing the President to excise individual items6" from appro-
priation bills.6 4 Its proponents claim that by striking out items
in appropriations bills, a president can intercept spending
come law. The President shall return with his objections any item
of appropriation disapproved to the House in which the Act or
joint resolution containing such item originated. The Congress
may, in the; manner prescribed under section 7 of article I for
Acts disapproved by the President, reconsider any item of appro-
priation disapproved under this article.
59. The override provision of U.S. CONST. art. I, §7 reads:
If [the President shall] approve [a Bill] he shall sign it but if not,
he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Jour-
nal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration,
two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be
sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it
shall likewise be considered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House it shall becomea Law . . .
60. The major item veto proposals in Congress include H.R. 470
(Rep. W. R. Archer, R-TX); S. J. Res. 178, S. 1921 (Sen. Mack Mattingly,
R-GA); H.J. Res. 357 (Rep. Jack Kemp, R-NY); H.J. Res. 399 (Rep. George
Gekas, R-PA); H.J. Res. 436 (Rep. Bill Green, R-NY); and S. J. Res. 26
(Sen. Alan Dixon, D-IL).
61. S.J. Res. 26, 129 CONG. REC. S13591 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1983).
62. See Dixon, The Case for Line Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'Y 207 (1985).
63. In the states the definition of "item" has been a subject of some
controversy. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Dodson, 176 Va. 281 11 S.E.2d
120, (1940); State University v. Trapp, 28 Okla. 81 (1911); Callaghan v.
Boyce, 17 Ariz. 433, 153 Pac. 773 (1915); People v. Brady, 227 Ill. 124
(1917); State v. Holder, 76 Miss. 158 23 So. 643, (1898).
64. Appropriation bills "have the limited and specific purpose of pro-
viding funds for authorized programs." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, at 190
(1977); U.S. ex rel Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 345 U.S. 153
at 164 n.5 (1953).
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measures he thinks unwise or otherwise opposes and thereby
reduce federal spending. 5 Without the item veto, the Presi-
dent will continue to lack recourse against spending measures
Congress may tuck within multisubject appropriations legisla-
tion.6 It is argued that the line item veto returns power to
the President by permitting him to remove items from appro-
priations bills.67
B. Item Veto Impact on Logrolling
The item veto is inadequate as a vehicle to eliminate the
adverse effects of logrolling because it ignores the effects that
logrolling has on the appropriations process in Congress it-
self. Just as a multisubject bill forces the President to con-
sider the bill as an entirety, so must a member of Congress
make that choice between approving or rejecting an entire
appropriations bill which contains spending provisions, some
of which he or she may consider unwise. Although Congress
as a group is responsible for multisubject appropriations bills,
individual members are powerless to remedy the system of
logrolling that pervades the process.
When the rules of Congress permit logrolling, those
rules violate the duty of all members of Congress to vote for
each measure on its own merits, and thereby comprise the
integrity of the lawmaking process. In much the same way
that legislating multifaceted bills abridges the power of the
executive to veto or approve a specific object of legislation on
its own merit, such practices remove the power of a member
of Congress to vote for or against a particular measure with-
out also voting the same way on unrelated measures to which
it is attached. Although the line item veto would reduce some
logrolling incentives, the item veto cannot eliminate the prac-
tice of logrolling. The item veto would only eliminate that
logrolling incentive created by the Constitutional limitation
that a president must veto or approve bills in their entirety."
Because of that limitation, when Congress attaches a
nongermane amendment to a bill which funds fundamental
governmental operations, the amending provision will often
65. See Remarks of Senator Alan Dixon and Mack Mattingly on the
floor of the Senate. 130 CONG. REC. S5297-S5321 (daily ed. May 3, 1984)
and 130 CONG. REC. S837 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1983).
66. Id.
67. The State of the Union, Address Delivered Before a Joint Session
of the Congress, 20 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 87 (January 25, 1984).
68. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §7.
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survive the presentment stage of the current legislative pro-
cess.6" This result will occur when the President, in weighing
the balance between the repugnance of one spending subject
and the necessity of another, resolves the issue in favor of the
necessity of one subject and enacts the entire bill. The item
veto would prevent Congress from restricting the President
in this manner and would thereby remove this Presidential
presentment incentive, for logrolling.
This veto disincentive of the item veto cannot, however,
eliminate many of the other incentives which perpetuate the
practice of logrolling in Congress. Often, the only way a
member of Congress can muster majority support for a local
project is to attach an amendment to an essential spending
bill which has sufficient support to pass the legislature. This
enhanced likelihood of passage at both the executive review
and legislative formulation stages is a major incentive to en-
courage legislative logrolling. Because the item veto does not
eliminate these strong incentives the practice of logrolling
will continue even if the President has the item veto power.
Because the item veto would permit the practice of log-
rolling to continue, it would not solve the decisional dilemma
which logrolling creates for members of Congress. Under the
item veto system, logrolling would continue to force individ-
ual members of Congress to consider logically unrelated
spending provisions as an entirety and vote on the complex
issues within such a bill as if it were a single issue.
An additional effect of the item veto would be to de-
crease Congressional accountability and responsibility for fed-
eral spending.70 It would be an excuse for Congress to aban-
don its search for an effective and efficient appropriations
process.1 The item veto system would allow members of
Congress to battle for federal spending to benefit their con-
stituents and then shift the unpopular decision to eliminate
some of the programs to the highly visible and politically sen-
sitive office of the President. It would decrease the Congres-
sional budget responsibility which Congress sought to acquire
69. Fisher, Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress, 29 CATH. U.
L. REv. 51 (1979);
70. Former economist for the Reagan Council of Economic Advisers,
Benjamin Zycker, suggests that the item veto "would allow congressmen to
boast to constituents about all the manna from Washington for which they
are battling endlessly, while permitting the president to masquerade as the
last bastion of frugality, with little net effect on the budget totals." Zycker,
An Item Veto Won't Work, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1984, at 32, col. 4.
71. Id.
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by placing constraints on the executive impoundment power
in 1974.2
C. Item Veto Impact on Executive and Legislative Power
Without addressing the merits and demerits of increased
executive power 7 3 this section shall explore some of the
ramifications of the item veto regarding the relationship of
the executive and legislative branches.
Under either an item veto system or the current system,
the President may continue to suggest programs and spend-
ing measures which he believes to be wise and recommend
appropriate federal spending levels for those programs when
he introduces his budget to Congress. If the item veto
amendment is adopted, however, the President's budget sug-
gestions could become imperatives to members of Congress
faced with the possibility that failure to enact the proposals of
the President may sound an item veto death knell to the
funding of their own projects. The power to suggest the ob-
ject and amount of spending, coupled with the coercive force
of an item veto, would greatly increase the President's power
over the legislature. It would allow his spending desires to
carry excessive weight with a legislature whose members' lo-
cal spending programs, and thus reelection, could fall with
one slash of the pen by a President with the item veto power.
Taking this power of "suggestion" a step further, one
72. In a meeting of the Jefferson Foundation, a nonprofit organiza-
tion dedicated to the study of public affairs, one member recognized that
"the balance of power between the executive and the legislative branches,
so finely honed by the founding fathers, a balance as necessary to the de-
fense of freedom and liberty of citizens today as it was deemed necessary in
1787, has become unbalanced heavily in favor of the executive. Certainly
the hand that holds the sword must be steadfastly denied a grasp upon the
purse strings. Empowering the President with the line item veto authority
might well serve as the death knell to legislative checks on presidential
power . . ." 130 CONG. REC. S5623 (daily ed. May 10, 1984) (remarks of
Paul Slayton). Not until Jackson's time did a President begin to substitute
his purely personal opinion for the opinion of Congress in deciding
whether to veto legislation. W. WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 658 (2d
ed. 1929).
73. The Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §631, was a
Congressional reaction to President Nixon's repeated refusals to obligate
funds which had previously been validly appropriated. The Act imposed
procedural oversight provisions which Congress could control Presidential
attempts at impoundment. By enacting the Congressional Budget Act of
1974, Congress sought to take control of Federal spending. According to
most critics, it has failed in that undertaking. See Budget Solution, Wall St.
J., Sept. 14, 1983, at 32, col. 1.
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recognizes the possible abuse of the item veto as a political
weapon. For example, if a Republican president set his sights
on an individual Democrat in Congress, he could slash spend-
ing items which would otherwise inure directly to the benefit
of that member's constituents and practically destroy the re-
election chances for that member.7 4 In the subsequent elec-
tion campaign, a Republican Congressional candidate could
have two cogent arguments with which to win votes. He or
she could argue (1) that the Democrat failed to obtain a fed-
eral program for the local district and (2) that he or she can
be more effective in acquiring local spending for the district
and in avoiding additional executive vetoes by the President
of his or her own party. Although this danger seems to exist
when the President has a veto of any kind, the line item veto
would give the President a focused instrument with which to
attack his political opponents and yet avoid harming his allies.
Giving the President the item veto power would also al-
low him to so tamper with the allocation of funds that he may
undermine the purpose of the legislation. Allowing the exec-
utive to eliminate items or parts within that program could
distort the general legislative objective of the program with-
out requiring the President to admit, through a full veto, that
he disagrees with the general legislative purpose. If a presi-
dent disapproves the relative spending allocated within a spe-
cific program, he implicitly disagrees with the legislative pur-
pose of that spending subject and should be required to
approve or veto that subject in its entirety.
III. SINGLE SUBJECT AMENDMENT PROPOSAL
A. Background and Purpose of Single
Subject Amendment Proposal
A Single Subject Amendment to prohibit Congress from
combining unrelated subjects of legislation would restore the
power of the executive to veto distinct subjects of legislation.
In this respect, it would accomplish the same object as the
line item veto. In addition, however, a Single Subject Amend-
74. The line item veto is a dangerously potent political weapon. John
Palffy, a policy analyst for the Heritage Foundation, has noted the objec-
tion of many Congressmembers that "the President could use the threat of
a line-item veto to further his political interests. He could, for instance
hold hostage discretionary projects supported by Congress to force signifi-
cant increases in defense spending, they argue, or he could target his veto
against his political opponents in election years." Palffy, Line-Item Veto:
Trimming the Pork, HERITAGE FOUNDATION BACKGROUNDER 343, April, 1984.
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
ment would deliver the Congress from the decisional di-
lemma created by logrolling.
Forty-two states have single subject provisions in their
constitutions."5 In 1844, New Jersey was the first state to
adopt an anti-logrolling provision as part of its constitution."6
The provision was specifically intended "to avoid improper
influences which may result from intermixing in one and the
same act such things as have no proper relation to each
other. . ."7 Many of these states except appropriations bills
from the single subject requirement because their constitu-
tions provide the governor with a veto over individual appro-
priation items.
The following is a proposed amendment to the United
States Constitution.
7 8
75. ALA. CONsT. art. IV, §45; ALASKA CONST. art. II, §13; ARIZ. CONST.
art. IV, part II, § 13; CAL. CONST. art. IV, §9; COLO. CONST. art. V, §21; DEL.
CONST. art. 11, §16; FLA. CONST. art. III, §6; GA. CONST. art. III, §VII,
Parag. 4; HAWAII CONST. art. III, §14; IDAHO CONST. art. III, §16; ILL.
CONST. art. IV, §8(c); IND. CONST. art. IV, §19; IowA CONST. art. §29; KAN.
CONST. art. II, §16; Ky. CONST. §51; LA. CONST. art. III, §15; MD. CONST.
art. III, §29; MICH. CONsT. art. §24; MINN. CONST. art. IV, §17; Miss.
CONST. art. IV, §69; Mo. CONST. art. III, §23; MONT. CONST. art. V, §11;
NEB. CONsT. art. III, §14; NEv. CoNsT. art. IV, §17; N.J. CONsT. art. IV,
§VII, parag. 4; N.M. CONST. art. IV, §16; N.Y. CONST. art. VII, §6; N.D.
CONsT. art. IV, §33; OHIO CONST. art. II, §15; OKLA. CONsT. art. V, §57; OR.
CONST. art. IV, §20; PA. CONST. art. III, §3; S.C. CONsT. art. III, §17; S.D.
CONST. art. III, §21; TENN. CONST. art. II, §17; TEX. CONST. art. III, §35;
UTAH CONST. art. VI, §22; VA. CONST. art. IV, §12; WASH. CONST. art. II,
§19; W.VA. CONsT. art. VI, §30; Wis. CONsT. art. V, §10; WYo. CONST. art.
III, §24.
76. N.J. CONsT. art. IV, §VII, parag. 4.
77. Id.; See also LUCE, LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 546 (1922).
78. The text of this amendment is roughly similar to the Single Sub-
ject provision in the Florida constitution which provides:
Sec. 6. Every law shall embrace but one subject matter and matter
properly connected therewith, and the subject shall be briefly ex-
pressed in the title.
Sec. 12. Laws making appropriations for salaries of public officers
and other current expenses of the state shall contain no other sub-
ject. FLA. CONsT. art. III.
The Florida item veto allows the Governor to veto any specific appropri-
ation in a general appropriations bill. Since the general appropriation bill
in Florida contains only "salaries for public officers and other current oper-
ating expenses of the state," the item veto in Florida is a relatively innocu-
ous power.
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Single Subject Amendment
Article
Section 1. Except for the general appropriations bill, Con-
gress shall not pass any bill which embraces more than a
single subject. Upon receiving a bill and.finding that it con-
tains a subject or subjects not directly related to the subject
of the bill, the President shall report that finding to the
Congress and refuse to execute the unrelated subject(s)
without affecting the remainder of the bill.
Section 2. The general appropriation bill may contain dis-
tinct subjects which will be necessary to provide for the sal-
aries of public officers, and other current operating ex-
penses of the federal government but shall not contain
provisions on any other subject.
B. Application of Single Subject Amendment
Appropriations bills originate in the House of Represent-
atives.7 9 After introduction in the House, the bill would be
referred to the House committee(s) and undergo the usual
committee scrutiny under a single subject system. If the com-
mittee decided to consider the bill, it could approve, amend,
or even entirely rewrite it. Most importantly, with a Single
Subject Amendment, the committee would be required to ex-
cise those portions not reasonably and directly related to the
subject of the bill. Under the constraints of a Single Subject
Amendment, each measure would be required to be "cog-
nate, attingent, and germane" to the subject of the bill.8"
When the bill reached the Senate, that body would like-
wise be required to consider it under the constraints of the
single subject rule.81 Finally, if House and Senate versions of
79. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §7, cl. 1.
80. The germaneness test which specifies that measures embrace but
a single subject so long as they are "cognate, attingent, and germane" to
the subject of the bill is the test which was used by the State of California
in Ex parte Hallawell 99 P. 490, 491, 155 Cal. 112 (1909). Calfornia has a
constitutional requirement that a bill shall embrace but one subject matter,
and declares that any matter foreign to the title of the bill shall be void.
CAL. CONST. art. IV, §9.
81. The language of Proposed Amendment Section 1 that "Congress
shall not pass any bill which embraces more than a single subject" would
make it futile for Congress to consider multi-subject legislation because
Congress could not constitutionally pass such legislation.
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a bill differed, the joint conference would have to hammer
out a compromise within the limits of the single subject rule
and could not agree to include extraneous matter to achieve
a compromise.
The increase in the aggregate number of bills necessi-
tated by the Single Subject Amendment would seem to pre-
sent a time problem for Congress, considering the difficulty
which Congress encounters in getting the current thirteen
appropriations bills out in time for the start of the fiscal
year. 82 However, the decreased breadth of single-subject bills,
would render some of them relatively uncontroversial and
thus tend to make them easier to pass. It seems likely, in fact,
that many of these uncontroversial appropriations bills, in-
cluding the general appropriations bill, could be passed rela-
tively early in the federal appropriations process because they
would require only minimal debate.
C. Enforcement of the Single Subject Amendment
The primary enforcement mechanism of the Single Sub-
ject Amendment would be the political interaction between
the executive and legislative branches. The proposed Single
Subject Amendment gives the President the power to "refuse
to execute the unrelated subject(s) without affecting the re-
mainder of the bill."8 This provision affords a strong politi-
cal enforcement mechanism. The possibility that the Presi-
dent might find parts of a bill violative the single subject
requirement and consequently refuse to execute those por-
82. As of Sept. 29, 1984, Congress had only passed four of its regular
thirteen appropriation bills and so attempted to pass a massive continuing
appropriation bill before its fiscal year ended on Oct. 1, 1984. (Congress
loads up emergency funding bill, 42 CONG. Q. 2355 (Sept. 29, 1984.)) It did
not pass the resolution in time for the start of the fiscal year and President
Reagan shut down the government for lack of federal spending authority
to keep it going without an appropriation bill. (Last-minute appropriations
bill tripped up, 42 CONG. Q. 2420 (Oct. 6, 1984)). One point of contention
in passing the continuing resolution was language in the bill which prohib-
ited any military aid to anti-government guerillas fighting the leftist gov-
ernment of Nicaragua. This provision would have been summarily ex-
cluded from the appropriation bill if Congress had been adhering to its
rule that matters of substantive policy should not be permitted in appropri-
ations legislation. Id. at 2418.
During that session Congress did enforce its germaneness rules to ex-
clude a provision to regulate the sale.of armor piercing ammunition in or-
der to protect law enforcement officers which had been included in an ap-
propriation bill. Id. at 2421.
83. Proposed Amendment §1.
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tions would operate as an incentive for Congress to adhere
closely to the Single Subject Amendment. If a President re-
fused to enact a provision under this Amendment, the Con-
gress could reconsider the bill as a new piece of legislation,
restricting the scope of the bill to a single subject.
This enforcement process appears similar to the item
veto amendment proposal in Senate Joint Resolution 26,84
which provides for a majority Congressional override of line
items vetoed by the President. However, the differences be-
tween these proposals are substantial. Under either the Sin-
gle Subject Amendment or S.J. Res. 26, a majority of Con-
gress can "repass" items of legislation vetoed by the
President. "Repassage" under S.J. Res. 26 is absolute: if a
majority of each House of Congress votes to override the
President's veto, the vetoed portions of the bill become law.
Under the Single Subject Amendment, however, Congress'
"repasses" the portions that the President refused to execute
by recasting them into separate bills. This legislation is then
subjected to the normal political processes, including another
exposure to Presidential veto and the requirement of a two-
thirds override.
This second possibility of a veto would also differ from
Presidential rejection of the subject under the Single Subject
Amendment grounds because the single subject objection is
based on the form of the bill whereas the veto pursuant to
Article I, Sec. 7 is based on disagreement with the substance
of the proposed subject of legislation.
Another difference between the operation of the Single
Subject Amendment and the various item veto proposals re-
lates to the specificity with which the President may reject
legislative provisions. Under the proposed Single Subject
Subject Amendment, the President's rejection of items is lim-
ited to those not related to the subject of the bill. Under the
item veto proposals, however, the President may exercise his
item veto arbitrarily in that any individual spending item to
which Congress has designated a specific amount of federal
funds, is subject to veto by the President.
D. Taxpayers Standing
Private parties might claim that they have been injured
by a legislative matter enacted in violation of the Single Sub-
ject Amendment or by a legislative matter rejected because
84. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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of the misapplication of the Single Subject Amendment.
However, federal rules of standing would preclude federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over taxpayers who claim
injury by a violation of the Single Subject Amendment. The
Supreme Court's rulings in Frothingham v. Mellon85 and Flast
v. Cohen8" establish rigid and narrow taxpayer standing re-
quirements according to which taxpayers would lack standing
to challenge violations of the proposed Single Subject
Amendment.
E. Standing of Congressmen
In addition to suits by taxpayers challenging a violation
of the proposed amendment, it is conceivable that a member
of Congress would seek redress in federal court claiming a
violation of the Single Subject Amendment. Such a claim
might arise where a member Congress asserts that Congress
itself has violated the proposed Amendment by including un-
related subjects in a piece of legislation or that the President
has violated the proposed amendment by wrongfully refusing
to execute portions of a bill sufficiently related to the Single
Subject of the bill.
Of the standards set forth in the Supreme Court's deci-
sions on standing a Congressman must at least establish spe-
cific injury in fact to a cognizable legal interest resulting from
the alleged violation of the Single Subject Amendment.8" At
85. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
86. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
87. Frothingham articulated several elements related to the type of in-
jury required to confer standing; Flast then narrowed the Frothingham rule.
In Flast, the Court stated that taxpayer must show a logical nexus between
his status as taxpayer and the claim sought to be adjusticated. The Court
then found that the logical nexus would only be present when (1) the tax-
payer is challenging Congressional exercises of the taxing and spending
power and (2) the challenged enactment exceeds specific Constitutional
limitations imposed in the taxing and spending power. The Court in Flast
found that the history behind the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment demonstrated that the establishment clause was enacted as a specific
limitation on the taxing and spending power and therefore held that the
taxpayer had standing. Since Flast, the only Congressional enactments
which have been found to "exceed specific limitations imposed on the exer-
cise of the taxing and spending power" and therefore meet the Flast test
have been enactments challenged under the establishment clause of the
first amendment. Although the proposed amendment is directly related to
the taxing and spending power, it cannot fairly be considered a specific
limitation on the power of Congress to spend. Rather, it is a specific limita-
tion only on the manner in which Congress can exercise an established
power to spend. In the establishment clause cases where the Court has
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least one Court, has held that a Congressman can establish a
sufficiently specific injury by asserting that a violation of the
origination clause of the United States Constitution 88 violated
his cognizable legal interest in having the opportunity to de-
bate and vote at the origination of legislation.89 Without-ana-
lyzing the decision of that case and speculating on future Su-
preme Court decisions, one can conclude that courts might
find that a member of Congress has standing to bring suit
against the Congress for putative violations of the Single Sub-
ject Amendment. If the Congressman could show a signifi-
cantly specific injury to a cognizable legal interest in enforc-
ing the single subject amendment.
F. Justiciability Generally
Another situation which a violation of the proposed
amendment might is in the context of a suit by a Congress-
man claiming that the President has violated the Single Sub-
ject Amendment by wrongfully refusing to execute legislative
provisions sufficiently related to the single subject of the at-
tached bill. This situation, as well as one in which a Congress-
man sued Congress, would likely constitute a nonjusticiable
political question.
The Supreme Court holds that the federal judiciary
should refuse to consider certain types of cases involving the
relationship between the coordinate branches of the federal
found such a specific limitation on the spending power, the taxpayers chal-
lenge the very power of Congress to spend for an allegedly unconstitu-
tional purpose. Under a claim that the Single Subject Amendment has
been violated, however, the taxpayer would not be challenging the actual
power of Congress to spend. Consequently, it is unlikely that federal courts
would be willing to expand the narrow holding of Flast by accepting a tax-
payers assertion that the Single Subject Amendment qualifies as a "specific
limitation on the taxing and spending power of Congress." 426 U.S. at
103. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Simon
v. Easten Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Association of Data Processing Ser-
vice Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). See for example, the
refusal to grant taxpayer standing in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) and especially Justice Stewart's
concurring opinion in which he commented that "I cannot now imagine a
case, at least outside the First Amendment area, where a person whose own
tax liability was not affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal
tax liability of someone else." (426 U.S. 26, 46 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, Cl. 1.
89. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir.
1984), cert. denied, __ U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 779 (1985).
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government.9" Such cases are thought to the best resolved by
the political process and are not suitable for judicial review.91
The text of the proposed amendment demonstrates that
the issue of whether a president has violated the proposed
arucndment is a political question left to the review of Con-
gress in the procedure by which Congress can reconsider al-
legedly nongermane portions of a bill after the President ref-
uses to execute them. The text of the proposed amendment
also demonstrates that the issue of whether the Congress has
violated the proposed amendment is a political question left
to the review by the President in the procedure by which the
President can refuse to execute legislative provisions that vio-
late the Single Subject Amendment. Therefore, even if pri-
vate taxpayers and individual members of Congress did have
standing to sue in federal court, the courts would find that
the issue of whether the Single Subject Amendment had
been violated is a nonjusticable political question.
G. Comparison of Single Subject and Item Veto Proposals
Unlike the item veto, the single subject proposal strikes
at logrolling itself. The proposed amendment would thwart
Congress' tendency to attach spending proposals of question-
able independent support onto essential appropriations bills
to second passage. By prohibiting logrolling distinct legisla-
tive subjects, the proposed amendment would permit both
the president and members of Congress to apply their politi-
cal expection and judgment separately to each legislative sub-
ject. The Single Subject Amendment would thereby increase
the integrity of the legislative process by permitting legisla-
tive decision-makers at each level to vote for or against any
single subject on its own merits. Members of Congress could
support spending to benefit their constituents and at the
same time vote against spending which consumes tax dollars
without an offsetting benefit to his constituents.
Another advantage that the Single Subject proposal has
over the Line Item Veto proposals is that the item veto
would decrease Congressional accountability for federal
spending, the Single Subject proposal would likely increase
the visibility members' votes on federal spending. Because
each subject would be a separate bill and members would
vote separately on each subject, each member would be on
90. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
91. Id. at 217.
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record as to what federal spending subject he or she sup-
ported. Under such a system, Congress would retain primary
responsibility for federal spending and a member would no
longer have available the excuse that he or she voted for so
much federal spending because much of it was attached to
what he or she considered essential spending subjects.
A final and significant difference between the Single Sub-
ject Amendment and the Line Item Veto lies in the impact of
each on the respective powers of the legislative and executive
branches. Because the focus of the single subject requirement
is on separating subjects of legislation rather than items of
spending, the veto power under a single subject system would
somewhat increase the specificity of the presidential veto but
would be significantly less specific than under an item veto
system. The item veto could be narrow enough to target an
individual member of Congress whereas a veto under the sin-
gle subject system could only operate as a blunt instrument.
The presidential veto of any subject that has majority support
of Congress will have greater ramifications regarding the
President's party and political allies than would a given item
veto. Consequently, a president would have less freedom
under the Single Subject system to veto solely for political
advantage than he would have under an item veto system.
In addition, the single subject rule would not allow a
president to approve a spending subject after having tam-
pered with the Congressional policy of the subject through
selective item vetoes. Therefore, it would preserve the Con-
gressional policy in each bill unless the President was willing
to admit his disagreement with the policy behind a particular
spending subject by vetoing the full bill.
CONCLUSION
Under a single subject system, both the President and
Congress have the opportunity to make decisions based on
logically connected pieces of legislation. Members of Con-
gress would be on record by rollcall votes as to how much
money they had allocated to each particular subject of fed-
eral government spending. The few members with specific
constituent interest in a particular subject might find it politi-
cally beneficial to have recommended allocation of a large
amount of federal funds for a specific subject. Most of the
members, however, would have less of a reelection stake in a
given bill because it would embrace fewer items. Legislators
who were relatively indifferent or slightly opposed to the pas-
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sage of particular subject of spending could vote against the
subject without jeopardizing the programs which they
strongly favored. Only those who had actually agreed to sup-
port a particular subject of funding or had a direct interest in
the passage of a given bill would have reason to vote for it.
Congressional logrolling is a reaction to the reelection
wishes of every member of Congress. The danger of logroll-
ing is that it permits the inclusion, in appropriations bills, of
many spending subjects which have not received the scrutiny
of each member of Congress. In this way, logrolling contrib-
utes to uncontrolled federal spending. It also undermines the
presidential veto as a check on legislative appropriations.
Without an enforceable rule to prevent logrolling and its
effects, logrolling will continue. The line item veto is an un-
acceptable solution to the problem of legislative logrolling
because it would permit the practice of logrolling to continue
and would unnecessarily increase the legislative power of the
president. The Single Subject Amendment proposed in this
article, would eliminate legislative logrolling without impair-
ing Congress's prerogatives.
A representative has a duty to make decisions which are
responsive to the interests of his constituents, but he has an
even higher duty to protect the interests of the nation as a
whole. His highest responsibility as a legislator, is to his own
"mature judgment" and "enlightened conscience." 2 Enlight-
ened and principled spending decisions are nearly impossible
in Congress because logrolling pits short-term interests in re-
election against the less immediate obligation to further the
interests of the nation.
A legislator who seeks to serve all of his political masters
including his constituents, his country and his conscience,
should recognize the value of the Single Subject Amend-
ment. The value of the Single Subject Amendment to a con-
scientious legislator lies in its ability to prevent that legislator
and other legislators from succumbing to the temption of
blindly accepting the proposals which other legislators attach
to appropriations bills in Congress. This temptation must be-
come overwhelming to a legislator who recognizes that de-
spite whatever spending proposals other members attach to
his own proposal, his future as a legislator may hinge on the
passage of his own proposal. It is reckless for a legislator to
place himself in this vexatious position. Regardless of the
merit of the individual measures in a multisubject spending
92. BURKE, SPEECHES AND LETTERS ON AMERICAN AFFAIRS (1908).
[Vol. I
19851 SINGLE SUBJECT RESTRICTIONS 257
bill, a legislator should shun any procedure which permits
logrolling and, thereby, practically requires him to vote un-
conditionally for any spending measures which other mem-
bers may attach to a provision which he intensely supports.

